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Papua New Guinea is enjoying yet another mineral price boom 
which is underpinning a recent expansion in manufacturing and 
services. But with a difference. Unlike in previous booms, prices of 
most cash crops have also been surging, with significant parts of the 
rural economy benefiting. However, it is not clear that there is much 
expansion of smallholder productive capacity. The fundamental 
constraints continue to exist—transport, communication and financial 
services, as well as the poor environment for formal sector investment 
in agricultural services, logistics and processing. The real test of Papua 
New Guinea’s management of the boom will be how it translates the 
surge in earnings into investment to address these problems.
Papua New Guinea has been undergoing 
another mineral price boom. The growth 
in (primarily government) revenues 
and spending has underpinned a strong 
expansion of manufacturing and services. 
Unlike in previous booms, prices of most 
cash crops have also been surging. Along 
with the effect on the exchange rate of 
active sterilisation of inflows by the Bank 
of Papua New Guinea and a deferral 
of much of the additional expenditure 
triggered by additional revenues, this has 
meant that significant parts of the rural 
economy have also been doing well. Much 
of the expansion of exports is, however, 
from more active harvesting of existing 
plantings: it is not clear that there is much 
expansion of smallholder productive 
capacity. The fundamental constraints of 
transport, communication and financial 
services—and the poor environment for 
formal sector investment in agricultural 
services, logistics and processing—still 
make smallholder investment a very risky 
proposition. The real test of Papua New 
Guinea’s management of the boom will 
be, as before, if it can translate the surge in 
earnings into investment to address these 
problems.
Recent economic developments
The economy of Papua New Guinea has 
recorded reasonably solid and broadly 
based growth in the past couple of years. 
Total gross domestic product (GDP) is 
estimated to have grown at an average rate 
of 3.3 per cent a year in the five years from 
2002 to 2007 (Table 1).
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Table 1 Papua New Guinea: recent growth performance, 2005–2007
  2005–06 2006–07 2002–07
 Growth rate Growth rate Trend  Sharea  
 (per cent p.a.) (per cent p.a.) (per cent p.a.) (per cent)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.7 3.7 2.9 33.6 
Oil and gas extraction –0.2 0.9 1.1 0.6 
Mining and quarrying –8.1 5.5 0.8 3.5 
Manufacturing 5.0 4.0 5.5 11.6 
Electricity, gas and water 3.0 3.0 4.6 2.2 
Construction 12.0 14.0 7.4 26.4 
Wholesale and retail trade 6.0 8.0 4.6 9.8 
Transport, storage and communication 5.0 35.0 7.3 7.8 
Finance, real estate and business services 8.5 6.2 2.6 2.7 
Community, social and personal services 2.5 4.0 0.5 1.8
Total 2.6 6.2 3.3 100.0
a Share of change in real GDP between 2002 and 2007 
Source: Papua New Guinea, 2007. 2008 National Budget Volume 1, Government of Papua New Guinea, Port 
Moresby.
In contrast with their performance in 
previous medium-term spells of growth, 
the oil, gas and mining sectors accounted 
for a relatively small share of the expansion. 
Agriculture is estimated to have accounted 
for one-third of the growth during the 
period, and construction more than one-
quarter. The manufacturing, construction 
and transport and communication sectors 
have grown particularly rapidly (Table 1).
Some of the growth is attributable to the 
recovery of business confidence in response 
to the restoration of fiscal discipline after 
the crisis at the beginning of the decade, 
and some of the growth in transport and 
communication is due to the successful 
launch of a new mobile phone service (Box 1). 
Increased investment in the mining sector has 
been an important factor behind the growth 
in construction. Much of the expansion is, 
however, due to the boom in commodity 
prices and the increases in expenditure 
(especially public expenditure) that the 
increase in export revenues has allowed. 
Fiscal and monetary policies
The government has been a direct beneficiary 
of the strong demand for resources from 
Asia in the past few years. Oil and copper 
prices have been at unprecedentedly 
high levels, and gold has also seen large 
increases. Mineral revenues in 2007 were 
more than five times higher than in 2002, 
driving a near doubling of total government 
receipts and facilitating an increase in total 
expenditure and net lending of more than 
80 per cent.
The impact on revenues of the sustained 
increases in commodity prices was not 
anticipated fully in the spending plans of 
successive annual budgets. The government 
responded to the increases with a series of 
supplementary budgets. In the past four 
years, K3.8 billion of additional expenditure 
was committed in this way. More than one-
third was transferred into trust accounts 
and, as of October 2007, about 40 per cent 
had not been released (Table 2). Only 17 per 
cent had been used to run down debt. 
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Box 1 
Telecommunications—a positive story
In the middle of 2007, a new entrant into the telecommunications sector brought an end to a 
long-standing monopoly. Prior to the launch, the World Bank estimated fixed line penetration 
in Papua New Guinea at slightly more than 1 per cent and mobile penetration of 3 per cent of 
the population, amongst the lowest in the world.  
    The new company, Digicel, with investment from the World Bank’s International Finance 
Corporation, has moved rapidly to roll out its network, which at the end of 2007 included 
197 sites covering 8 provinces and the National Capital District. The company estimates that 
about 1.8 million people live in the area covered by the sites. The company plans to roll out 
services to an additional 11 provinces in 2008, to provide access in all regional centres in the 
country. 
    The competition introduced by the new entrant has seen a significant reduction in the costs 
of mobile telephony in the country, and the provision of a much wider range of services. It has 
also created new job and income earning opportunities, including for street vendors of pre-
paid cards. But most importantly it has meant that people in many rural areas of the country 
are in telephone contact, with significant implications for the transactions costs in the value 
chain for rural products. 
Source: International Finance Corporation, Digicel advertising supplement.
Table 2 Papua New Guinea: supplementary budget appropriations and expenditure, 
2008
 Appropriated Share of total Spenta Paid into Not releaseda 
  appropriation  trust account 
 (kina million) (per cent) kina million (kina million) (kina million)
Health 388 10 21 185 182 
Education 453 12 34 247 172 
Law and justice 333 9 36 120 177 
Transport infrastructure 634 17 216 140 278 
Income earning opportunities 140 4 10 75 55 
Gas equity 500 13 - 500 - 
Debt and other liability  
  paymentsb 647 17 100 - 547 
Others 725 19 443 51 231
Total 3,820 100 860 1,318 1,642
a as at 23 October 2007 
b Other liabilities are primarily the Government’s outstanding liability to the public servants superannuation 
fund. 
Source: Papua New Guinea, 2007. 2008 National Budget Volume 1, Government of Papua New Guinea, Port 
Moresby.
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The 2008 Budget discusses at some length 
how the government intends to handle 
surging mineral revenues, recognising the 
difficulty of predicting these revenues and 
the dangers of predicating expenditure on 
expectations of revenue flows that might 
not be realised. It proposes that only the 
component of expected mineral revenue 
that equals 4 per cent of GDP will be used 
to fund continuing spending. The remainder 
will be split between additional public 
investments and repayment of public 
debt. A guideline ratio of 60 per cent for 
public investments and 40 per cent for debt 
repayment is proposed. If this guideline 
had been applied in 2006 and 2007, debt 
repayments would probably have been 
considerably higher than the K647 million 
appropriated under the supplementary 
budgets. It also appears that the guideline 
is not being followed closely in the 2008 
Budget, which allocates only 21 per cent 
of estimated additional mineral revenue to 
reducing debt and other liabilities.
The most prudent course in the past few 
years would have been to use the revenue 
surge to reduce debt much further. While the 
broad allocation of the trust funds is in line 
with well-established priorities, the test will 
be in how the resources are finally used. Past 
experience with trust funds shows that good 
intentions are not always realised.
Although the strong fiscal position led 
to a reduction in the banking system’s net 
claims on government in 2006 and 2007, the 
money supply grew strongly in those years—
by 39 and 27.3 per cent respectively (Kamit 
2008). Rapid growth in net foreign assets of 
the banking system played a large role in this 
expansion (net foreign assets grew by 58.2 per 
cent in 2006 and 51.7 per cent in 2007, as gross 
international reserves increased by more than 
K3.6 billion compared with 2005 levels—a 
change of more than 150 per cent).
Figure 1  Recent movements in exchange rates, 2002–2007
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Note: The figure shows indexes of the kina value of the Australian and US dollars and the trade-weighted 
exchange rate index, and the indexes deflated by the consumer price index. 
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, various years. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues, Bank of Papua 
New Guinea, Port Moresby.  
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Exchange rates and prices
The commodity price boom has generated 
a significant increase in foreign exchange 
earnings. Compared with the previous 
commodity boom (in the early 1990s), 
however, this has not translated into a major 
nominal appreciation of the kina (Figure 
1). While the kina has appreciated against 
the US dollar since 2002, it has depreciated 
against the Australian dollar, and the trade-
weighted exchange rate has held nearly 
constant. Most of the appreciation against 
the US dollar occurred before commodity 
revenues surged. As the 2008 Budget papers 
point out, the exchange rate has not reflected 
the large increase in Papua New Guinea’s 
terms of trade caused by the commodity 
boom, or the significant increase in foreign 
reserves.
There are two key factors that contribute 
to this. The first is that since the majority of 
mineral export revenues that accrue to Papua 
New Guinea do so as government revenues, 
the impact on monetary aggregates and the 
exchange rate are determined heavily by 
fiscal policy: the level and foreign exchange 
content of government spending associated 
with the increase in export earnings. 
Because the government has as yet not 
spent the entire revenue surge, there has not 
been such a significant impact on domestic 
absorption. Where revenue allocated to trust 
funds is earmarked for spending on local 
goods and services, this could eventually 
spill over into pressure on prices and the 
exchange rate. Where it is earmarked for 
foreign exchange expenditure—such as 
equity in the gas project—the outlays will 
not impact on the demand for kina. 
The second factor is the extent to which 
the Bank of Papua New Guinea has offset 
accumulation of foreign assets by direct 
sterilisation actions, such as the issuance of 
bills to withdraw liquidity from the market, 
combined with the fact that only a portion 
of the foreign exchange that is converted 
into kina passes through the foreign 
exchange market; a significant proportion 
of the conversion of the government’s 
foreign exchange inflows occurs outside 
the market. 
The consumer price index (CPI) suggests 
that in the five years to 2007, prices have 
increased at an average rate of 3.5 per 
cent a year. Adjusting the trade-weighted 
exchange rate index for this change implies 
a real appreciation of about 18 per cent since 
2002; the real trade-weighted exchange rate 
had, however, not changed since 2004 when 
commodity prices began surging upwards 
(Figure 1).1  
A closer look at agriculture
Agricultural value-added has grown on 
average by 2.9 per cent a year since 2002 
(Table 1). The Treasury estimated the 
underlying data, since the statistics office 
had not issued any new GDP estimates 
since 2002. In that year, about 50 per cent 
of estimated agricultural value added was 
non-marketed produce (primarily food). 
Growth in this component of agriculture 
is usually estimated to be the same as 
population growth, with adjustments 
made when bad weather or other shocks 
occur; basically, however, there are no 
hard data on which to chart changes in 
a large part of the sector’s production. 
More information is available on the main 
export cash crops, but this reflects export 
sales rather than production. (Very limited 
data are available on food produced 
for market sales, or for betel-nut—a 
major domestic cash crop with extensive 
distribution networks.) With this caveat 
in mind, it is possible to say something 
about the main cash generators for much 
of rural Papua New Guinea. 
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Where cash crops are grown
For obvious geo-climatic reasons, not all 
parts of Papua New Guinea can grow the 
main export cash crops (copra, copra oil, 
palm oil, coffee, cocoa, tea and rubber). 
Other factors, however—such as transport 
infrastructure—limit production in some 
areas where production is feasible.
Data assembled by the National 
Economic and Fiscal Commission make 
it clear that some parts of the country 
produce very little in the way of these 
crops. West New Britain accounts for more 
than 30 per cent of cash crop production, 
while Western, Gulf, Sandaun, Manus and 
Southern Provinces produce hardly any of 
these crops (Figure 2).
Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
production of the main cash crops by region. 
More than 90 per cent of the nation’s coffee 
and all of its tea is grown in the Highlands 
region; nearly all rubber is grown in Southern 
Province; and about 80 per cent of cocoa and 
copra is exported from the islands.
Recent developments: prices and 
production
Most cash crops have experienced a 
significant increase in prices. Increasing food 
demand from Asia—as well as the impact of 
industrial-country policies on bio-fuels and 
the impact on bio-fuel demand of soaring 
petroleum prices—has affected palm oil, 
copra and coconut oil. Coffee prices in 2007 
were higher than the previous peak in 1994, 
and cocoa prices reached the highest level 
since 1991. The weighted price of the main 
cash crops has increased by more than 100 
per cent since 2001 (Figure 4).
The production response to these price 
changes has been rather variable. Copra 
and copra-oil exports have surged in the 
past five years, but copra exports are still 
way below levels reached in the early 1990s 
(Figure 5 and Table 3). Palm-oil exports 
have been growing quite rapidly in the past 
couple of years, while coffee exports have 
declined.2 What is significant is that in the 
past decade and a half, only palm oil, tea 
and rubber production have grown at faster 
average rates than population. 
What seems to be happening is that, 
with the exception of palm oil, there is 
little if any expansion in plantings or 
productivity. This is a long-term problem. A 
recent study (Reddy 2007) of the agricultural 
sector in the Pacific showed that per capita 
crop production in Papua New Guinea was 
no higher in 2001–03 than it had been 40 
years earlier. A companion study by Fleming 
(2007) suggested that such productivity 
growth as was observed in PNG agriculture 
was driven by the oil-palm sector. 
With the exception of oil-palm—and 
some rather sporadic outbursts of non-
traditional cash crops—rural output growth 
has therefore been pretty poor. It is not 
clear that per capita rural incomes (other 
than flows to landowners from mineral 
and logging activities, and which have not 
been distributed widely) have grown much 
in real terms since the early 1990s. In 2006 
prices, real incomes from the seven main 
export crops have grown at a trend rate of 
1.8 per cent since 1990—well below the rate 
of growth of the rural population. 
Apart from palm oil, the bulk of cash 
crop production is in smallholder hands, 
so the key question is why smallholders are 
not investing in larger plantings or higher-
productivity technologies. Some insights 
into this question come from looking at a 
once important tree crop: coconut.
A coconut story
As with other parts of the Pacific, in Papua 
New Guinea, coconut palms generate a 
significant range of products and services 
for the rural community. Among these, 
copra destined for export or local processing 
into coconut oil has long been a major source 
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Figure 2  Agriculture, forestry and marine export production, by province (per cent) 
Note: Data used by the National Economic and Fiscal Commission to estimate revenue allocations for the 
derivation component of the revenue sharing formula. 
Source: National Economic and Fiscal Commission (NEFC), personal communication.
Table 3 Papua New Guinea: growth in export quantities, 1991–2007
 Unit Copra Palm oil Coffee Cocoa Tea Copra oil Rubber
1991 Index 1991=100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2002 Index 1991=100 36 162 135 97 111 85 136 
2007 Index 1991=100 53 192 121 125 151 163 161
Trend  2002–07 Per cent per annum 9.9 2.9 –3.6 4.6 4.1 9.0 3.5 
Trend 1991–2007 Per cent per annum –8.8 4.0 0.6 1.7 2.5 1.5 2.9
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, 2007. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues, Bank of Papua New 
Guinea, Port Moresby.
agriculture
0 0 0 0 0
Western
Gulf
central
m ilne Bay
oro
Eastern Highlands
Western Highlands
Simbu
Enga
Southern Highlands
m orobe
m adang
East Sepik
Sandaun
m anus
new ireland
East new Britain
West new Britain
north Solomons
logs
0.0 .0 0.0 .0 0.0 .0 0.0
Western
Gulf
central
m ilne Bay
oro
Eastern Highlands
Western Highlands
Simbu
Enga
Southern
m orobe
m adang
East Sepik
Sandaun
m anus
new ireland
East new Britain
West new Britain
north Solomons
m arine
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Western
Gulf
central
m ilne Bay
oro
Eastern Highlands
Western Highlands
Simbu
Enga
Southern
m orobe
m adang
East Sepik
Sandaun
m anus
new ireland
East new Britain
West new Britain
north Solomons
total
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Western
Gulf
central
m ilne Bay
oro
Eastern Highlands
Western Highlands
Simbu
Enga
Southern
m orobe
m adang
East Sepik
Sandaun
m anus
new ireland
East new Britain
West new Britain
north Solomons

Pacific  Economic  BullEtin
Economic  survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 Number 1 2008 © Asia Pacific Press
Figure 3  Papua New Guinea: distribution of export crops, by region (per cent)
Note: Data used by the National Economic and Fiscal Commission to estimate revenue allocations for the 
derivation component of the revenue sharing formula. 
Source: National Economic and Fiscal Commission (NEFC), personal communication.
Figure 4  Average price (production weighted) of the main export cash crops, 1991–2007
Note: The chart shows the average price of coffee, cocoa, copra, copra oil, palm oil, tea and rubber, weighted by 
2002 production volumes. 
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, various years. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues, Bank of Papua 
New Guinea, Port Moresby.
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Figure 5  Export quantities, 1991–2007 (’000 tonnes)
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, various years. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues, Bank of Papua 
New Guinea, Port Moresby; Papua New Guinea, 2007. 2008 National Budget. Volume 1, Government of Papua 
New Guinea, Port Moresby.
of cash earnings for people in the Islands 
and Southern Provinces. Smallholders 
now manage the bulk of coconuts; many of 
these trees, however, are on pre and post-
independence plantations that have reverted 
to traditional ownership. More than half of 
the palms were estimated to be senile in 1995 
(Arancon 1997). A major source of the value 
of coconut palms is the shade they provide 
for growing other cash and food crops: the 
shade reduces the need for fertiliser and 
other inputs to manage stress.
Copra exports have been in long-term 
decline (Table 3). Declining world prices 
are one reason for this, but in those parts 
of the country with coconut stands and 
limited alternative cash-generating options, 
copra harvesting would continue if market 
access were reasonably assured (Warner et 
al. 2007). 
Exports have been hit by two additional 
factors: a general deterioration in transport 
infrastructure for the main coconut-growing 
areas was exacerbated by the deregulation 
of copra marketing. Termination of the 
effectively subsidised services of the 
Copra Marketing Board (CMB) adversely 
affected copra production in provinces 
such as Milne Bay, East Sepik, Morobe and 
Manus, which were afflicted by the lack 
of a marketing infrastructure and high 
shipping/transport costs. Some of the 
provinces—Central, Gulf and Oro in the 
Papua region and Sandaun in the Momase 
region—that used to produce and trade 
copra ceased after the deregulation. (It 
should be noted that marketing problems 
preceded deregulation.) A recent study of 
the coconut sector pointed out that
[t]he CMB appears to have performed 
satisfactorily through the 1980s, 
however during the late 1990s became 
insolvent due to a combination of the 
adverse market developments…plus 
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the impacts of poor management and 
political interference at a board level. 
The bottom line was that insolvency 
[led] to producers not being paid 
in full. Many smallholders acted 
rationally and chose not to actively 
harvest for cash sale to traders and the 
CMB. Production fell dramatically and 
still remains low (Warner et al. 2007).
A second development—less unfortunate 
for coconut harvesters—is that an increasing 
proportion of copra has been crushed 
into crude coconut oil by local mills. For 
example, the proportion of copra that was 
crushed in 2005 was 77 per cent; in 2006, it 
was 85 per cent; and, in 2007, the proportion 
increased to 90 per cent.
The industry’s overall performance has 
improved in the past two years. There are 
four main reasons for this. 
• Higher world prices since the second 
half of 2006 have had a positive effect 
on copra production throughout the 
country. 
• The establishment of a third major 
copra-oil mill in Port Moresby recently 
has provided market access for the 
coconut growers in the Central and 
Gulf Provinces. Coconut growers began 
to produce copra again in mid 2007. 
By the end of 2007, production from 
the Central Province was about 27 
metric tonnes and from Gulf Province 
it was about 3 metric tonnes. The new 
mill’s copra-buying activities have also 
extended to Milne Bay, Morobe and 
Madang, with plans to extend to Wewak 
in 2008. This expansion has led to an 
increase in Milne Bay Province copra 
production in 2007; resumption of copra 
production in Morobe Province after the 
withdrawal of buyers and/or exporters 
from the province in 2005; and enhanced 
competition, leading to relatively higher 
prices in Madang with the presence of 
alternative buyers of copra.
• The entry of buyers into what used 
to be the traditional trading areas for 
the two crude coconut oil mills in East 
New Britain and Madang Provinces. 
The entry of additional players has 
significantly boosted the mill-gate prices 
received by the growers in these two 
provinces as competition for copra has 
intensified.
• Reduction in the management levies for 
copra and coconut oil by 49 per cent and 
45 per cent respectively between 2002 
and 2007. These reductions in levies 
translate to more than K1 million being 
retained by exporters of copra and 
coconut oil in the same period.   
Despite these positive trends, however, 
there are still significant tracts of coconuts 
that are not producing copra because no 
traders are accessing these areas due to high 
shipping and/or other costs. Between 1997 
and the 2002 pre-deregulation period, annual 
copra production averaged about 138,000 
metric tonnes per annum. In the past five 
years (2003–06) post deregulation, average 
annual copra production has stagnated 
at about 95,500 tonnes. Consequently, 
an average of 42,500 tonnes of copra 
equivalent per annum has been ‘lost’ 
since the deregulation of copra marketing. 
This translates to a reduction of about 
K25.2 million in rural copra farm incomes 
per annum.3 As with other export crops, 
the industry has not been helped by the 
dysfunctional state of the government 
commodity bodies that oversee key aspects 
of the sector (Box 2).
Looking forward
The problems plaguing coconut producers 
are replicated—with variations—across 
coffee and cocoa and most other cash 
crops. A recent study of the coffee and 
cocoa industries for the Australian Centre 
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Box 2 
Government commodity bodies: help or hindrance?
Governance issues affecting commodity boards and R&D institutions in Papua New 
Guinea have received wide coverage and scrutiny in the past ten years compared to other 
sub-sectors of the agriculture sector. Much of this stems from the political economy in the 
appointments of directors to the commodity boards, and the subsequent politicisation of 
these organisations has almost rendered them dysfunctional. The coconut sector provides an 
example of this problem and recent decisions of the Coffee Board highlight the erratic nature 
of the behaviour of these bodies.
The KIK story 
The Kokonas Indastri Koporesen (KIK) was established in the latter half of 2002 by the 
Kokonas Indastri Koporesen Act 2002, replacing the Copra Marketing Board as part of the 
Government’s deregulation plans for the coconut industry. The Act empowered an Interim 
Board to provide policy direction to move the new entity and the coconut industry forward. 
A major task in this regard was the formation of a permanent Board. However, frequent 
changes at the Interim Board and management levels since 2002 have resulted in lack of 
stable leadership in KIK thus leading to the prolonged delay in the formation of associations 
for smallholders, plantations, processors and exporters. The formation of these associations 
is necessary for smallholders to be nominated for consideration for appointment on the full 
KIK Board as stipulated in the Act.
Since the deregulation, the KIK has had 7 Chairmen and 4 CEOs/Managing Directors in 
a space of five years. The frequent changes have delayed the accomplishments of certain 
milestones in the 5-year transitional phase. The current management and board are expected 
to achieve in a few months what was to have taken over five years to accomplish.
The ban on cherry sales
The Coffee Industry Corporation (CIC) recently imposed a blanket ban on the sale of 
cherry coffee. The CIC was reported in the Post Courier weekend edition of 1–3 February as 
saying that the ban was imposed to avoid stealing of cherry coffee and to control quality of 
cherry coffee. The CIC said growers do not seem to benefit from their coffee due to constant 
thefts of cherry and the increase in roadside buying of cherry coffee. It said at the same 
time quality of the coffee has dropped and the ban is necessary to ensure growers receive 
direct benefit while coffee quality is properly maintained. Unfortunately, as documented in 
recent studies of the coffee sector, cherry sales gain premium over sales of parchment coffee 
precisely because exporters can control the final quality when they purchase cherry (Quirke, 
Harding and Warner 2007). 
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for International Agricultural Research 
(ACIAR) suggested that, although the 
suitability of these crops for smallholders 
was demonstrated compellingly by their 
durability as a main cash crop through much 
of the Highlands and Islands regions, 
[t]he key impediments to economic 
activity in these sectors have been well 
documented in the literature and by 
ACIAR research projects. These are 
roads, law and order (lack of security) 
and problems associated with land 
tenure and tribal conflict. 
In addition, we suggest the following 
factors could be added as binding 
constraints: capacity to hold money 
(more so than the availability of 
credit), and falls in health status that 
have directly affected ability to supply 
labour.
The combination of these factors 
probably overwhelms many other 
issues that would be considered 
significant impediments in countries 
with better developed markets (Quirke 
et al. 2007). 
This diagnosis is put forward also in 
the government’s National Agricultural 
Development Plan (NADP),  which 
identifies the following as overarching 
constraints in the sector: transport and 
communication; law and order; land tenure; 
financing; natural resource management; 
standards, quality control, processing and 
regulation; marketing and promotion; 
and gender and social issues. The report 
of the national consultative workshop on 
agriculture and rural development, which 
was held to provide major inputs into the 
formulation of the NADP, also stressed 
the need for significant improvements in 
overall governance and probity in public 
expenditure management (NARI 2002).
The diagnosis is reinforced by the 
findings of a recent study of the informal 
sector by the Foreign Investment Advisory 
Service of the World Bank. The study (FIAS, 
forthcoming) indicates that lack of access to 
markets ‘appears to be an issue most acutely 
felt by people living in rural communities’. 
Its main recommendations include the 
upgrading of transportation infrastructure 
linking rural areas with urban areas and 
urban centres with different regions, and 
upgrading the quality of formal urban 
markets to ensure they meet minimum 
standards relating to shelter, clean water, 
drainage, garbage disposal and toilet 
facilities. As Box 3 shows, the transport 
infrastructure problem continues to fester.
The big question is whether these 
diagnoses are informing government 
policy formation and expenditure planning. 
The key indicators here are the NADP for 
2007–16 and annual budgets.
The government has indicated its 
intention to allocate some of the revenue 
windfall to transport infrastructure and 
the law and justice sector (Table 2). The 
2008 Budget also allocates K196 million 
to a trust fund for future expenditure on 
the National Infrastructure Development 
Program—pending approval of a five-year 
funding program—as well as more than K100 
million in additional priority expenditure 
on transport infrastructure. The focus 
of the recommendation in the NADP is, 
however, on agricultural research, extension, 
information and training; crop development 
through strategies such as the rehabilitation 
of plantations, promotion of nucleus estates 
and cooperatives; rehabilitation of breeding 
centres; gender, social and HIV/AIDS related 
issues; regulatory and technical services; and 
management of the plan itself. 
These areas are important, and important 
efforts are under way to strengthen the 
national agricultural research system and 
to make it more responsive to farmers’ 
needs. Expansion of agricultural output 
and improvements in productivity will, 
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Box 3 
Transport and cash crops
Two articles in the Post Courier of 13 February 2008 highlight the centrality of transport to 
producers of cash crops.
MILLIONS of kina worth of coffee is stranded and major planters fear they could be 
forced out of business if the only road linking them to factories in Kainantu, Eastern 
Highlands Province is not fixed.  
 Reports from Kainantu yesterday confirmed the plight of the planters who own and 
run 32 large plantations at the border of the Obura/Wonenara and Kai-nantu areas. 
‘The coffee season for this year has started and we are picking our coffee but we can 
not move them to the factories in Kainantu because we have no road’, a spokesman and 
owner of Akamupa plantation, Sailas Kai said from Kainantu yesterday. 
‘We can not use the only road linking us to the factories because flooding in recent 
weeks is taking away the Iyaarumba bridge’, he said. 
Mr Kai said the plantations expected a bumper crop this season but feared the 
hundreds of tonnes of coffee they picked were not going into the factories because of the 
destruction to the road and bridge by the Iyaarumba River.
THE Highlands Highway has been cut off at Daulo Pass again.
Continuous rain in the region triggered another massive landslip at Daulo Pass on 
Monday night, cutting off the four highlands provinces and resources development 
projects in Enga and Southern Highlands provinces. 
The landslip occurred at the same location where part of a mountain collapsed, cutting 
off the highway last week. 
Eastern Highlands provincial works manager Steven Sapalo yesterday said the latest 
landslip was three times bigger than last week’s slip which saw the flow of traffic come to 
a standstill for a week.
however, depend on the willingness 
of smallholders to take on the risks of 
investment. Most smallholders face an 
uncertain environment, with limited access 
to modern means to cope with shocks. 
As a consequence, they have adopted 
diversified production strategies, mixing 
food production with cash generation in 
crops in which plantings were made many 
years ago, using very low input, non-
intensive systems. (A study by Curry et al. 
[2007] into the decision-making processes 
in cocoa production and management 
in two cocoa-producing areas in East 
New Britain found that cocoa-producing 
smallholders tended to pursue a diverse 
range of livelihood strategies as reflected 
in the patterns of labour allocation among 
households. The three major income-
generating activities were cocoa and copra 
production and local marketing of garden 
produce.)
Lack of consistent market access and the 
high associated transaction costs caused by 
poor property security and erratic transport 
and communications reduces the incentives 
to earn cash (there is not much to buy), to 
expand cash crop production or to invest in 
higher yields or improved quality through 
more input-intensive production systems. 
At the same time, business investment in 
activities in the value chain before and after 
the ‘smallholder farm gate’ is problematic. 
This affects smallholders with respect to 
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information flows, input supplies, post 
harvest handling, transport logistics and 
interaction with non-local and world 
markets. 
Unless these constraints are addressed, 
direct government spending in agriculture, 
and the strategies envisaged in the plan, 
are unlikely to be very successful. While 
the strategies adopted by smallholders 
have proved to be very robust, population 
pressures and declining land fertility 
could increasingly threaten them. Most 
commodity forecasts suggest that the 
current high prices for the main cash crops 
will not continue into the medium term, so 
the need for productivity improvements 
will become more pressing. As long as 
the incentives for intensification and 
specialisation remain so weak, however, 
smallholders might remain unwilling to 
make the necessary investments, even if the 
technologies are available.
Conclusion
Papua New Guinea is experiencing 
an unprecedented stimulus, in which 
mineral and most agricultural commodity 
prices are booming. To date, the potential 
negative effects of this boom on the rural 
economy—through inflation and real 
exchange rate appreciation—have been 
relatively mild, and have been offset for 
those people producing the key agricultural 
export commodities. Rural people not 
engaged in producing these crops could 
be experiencing rather harder times, and 
it is to be expected that urban demand for 
imported foodstuffs might rise, impacting 
on local food production for the market.
There has been a supply response to the 
improved agricultural prices—but much of 
this is in the form of increased harvesting 
effort, rather than new plantings or use of 
higher-yielding varieties and technologies. 
A sustained supply expansion depends 
on addressing the constraints that reduce 
incentives for rural specialisation and 
investment—and these constraints are 
well known. The challenge for government 
will be to take advantage of its current 
windfall to tackle these constraints seriously; 
otherwise, as with previous booms, all that 
will be left when it is over is a sense of lost 
opportunities. 
Notes
1 This conclusion must be treated with some 
caution, given the great limitations of the 
CPI as a measure of real price movements in 
the economy. The index is based on a basket 
for urban consumers, with weights that 
are about one-quarter of a century old. The 
index certainly understates the impact of fuel 
price changes and does not adequately (if at 
all) capture movements in rents, which are 
known to have been increasing rapidly in the 
past few years in the main urban centres. 
2 Coffee was seriously affected by adverse 
weather conditions in 2006. 
3 This is based on a five-year (2003–07) average 
‘fair merchantable standard’ (FMS) price of 
K594 per tonne.
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